Ⅰ期（一般・社会人）

受験番号		氏名	

令和 2 年度
武蔵野大学大学院　人間社会研究科　人間学専攻　言語聴覚コース　入学試験問題　（9 月 22 日）
［　英語　］　下記の英文を読んで、問いに答えなさい

①By emphasizing the neuroanatomical and dynamic properties of the brain in seeking the mechanisms of consciousness, I may appear to be sidestepping some fundamental issues related to conscious experience. How, for example, does our neural model fit with the experienced properties of a conscious subject? I believe that the issue is best clarified by stressing the neural mechanisms first, and then going back and forth between phenomenal issues and these mechanisms to show their consistency with each other.

One extraordinary phenomenal feature of conscious experience is that normally it is all of a piece – it is unitary. Any experienced conscious moment simultaneously includes sensory input, consequences of motor activity, imagery, emotions, fleeting memories, bodily sensations, and a peripheral fringe. In any ordinary circumstances it does not consist of "just this pencil with which I am writing," nor can I reduce it to that. Yet, at the same time, one unitary scene flows and transforms itself into another complex but also unitary scene. Alternatively, it can shift into diffuse reverie or into high focal attention by choice or under stress.

One way of describing this is to say that while conscious experience is highly integrated, it is at the same time highly differentiated. In short time periods, it can range phenomenally over a multitude of inner states. This apparently unending change and changeability nonetheless cannot at any one time be dissected into unique isolated parts by the person experiencing these subjective states. This is not to deny that consciousness can be modulated by focal attention. We will discuss such focused narrowing of the conscious scene later when we consider the relation between conscious and non-conscious activities.

The subjective experience of rich inner ②conscious states must be contrasted with the inability of a conscious subject to carry out three or more ③conscious acts simultaneously – for example, type text, recite a poem, and answer a quiz, all at the same time. This inability to execute multiple tasks simultaneously has caused some to consider consciousness to be of very limited utility. But in fact, it is likely that this apparent limitation derives from the evolutionary necessity that motor actions and plans not be interrupted before completion. Moreover, 註the view that "chunking" simultaneous conscious acts at best into only two or three units reveals a limit to the efficacy of the conscious state misconstrues the relationship of that state to instrumental acts in the future. As we shall see, a major function of consciousness and its underlying neural mechanisms is planning and rehearsal and, for these, the multifarious complexity of successive inner states is just what is required. For planning, we must rehearse distinctions that make a difference from an individual's vantage point; that is, from the first-person view of a subject. ④Carrying out motor acts or other performances often requires conscious rehearsal, but, after learning, such acts are more effectively executed by the subject without direct conscious supervision,

except when novel circumstances arise. It is not surprising that an attempt to execute two or more of any such acts that require completion is likely to be interrupted by conscious intervention.

How about phenomenal experience itself? What is it that appears to the conscious subject? What does he or she feel? The term "quale" has been applied to the experiencing of feeling – say, of green, or warmth, or pain. Philosophers have considered the understanding of qualia to be a critical problem in consciousness research. Some of their concerns relate to the apparent discrepancy in kind between neural activity and the structure and "feel" of qualia. I shall devote some space to this issue, which, simply stated, explores what it is like to be a conscious individual in a particular species – or, as the philosopher Thomas Nagel has put it, "What is it like to be a bat?"

To get at this issue, a number of subsidiary issues must be addressed. ⑤The first relates to the notion that neural activity, as measured and understood by a scientific observer, has none of the properties we ascribe to qualia. Here it is useful to remember that the conscious experience of qualia is a process. The dynamic structural origin of properties, even conscious properties, need not resemble the properties it gives rise to: an explosion does not resemble an explosive. A second issue concerns subjectivity and the first-person perspective. Consciousness is a process that is tied to an individual body and brain and to their history. ⑥From an observational point of view, the first-person experience is not written in transferable currency that is completely negotiable by a third-person scientific observer. But it is a reasonable starting point to assume that first-person experiences in individuals of a given species have some things in common. So it is no surprise that, while I can at least surmise as a human what it is like to be you as another human, it is not possible to be nearly as certain in trying to imagine what it is like to be a bat.

I shall indulge later in an exercise to see how our model of primary consciousness might give rise to a sense of scene even in a bat. But first it is useful to point out that we already have ample evidence from neuroscience to suggest why different qualia have different feels. The neural structures and dynamics underlying vision are distinct from those of smell, and those for touch differ from those of hearing, and so on. Although no scientific description of these pathways and their activities can give rise to a specific quale in the reader's mind, if we assume that he or she has an adequately equipped nervous system, he or she can relate such a description to a first-person experience. No matter what structure underlies a quale, it can be discriminated from others. One might say: "If it weren't this way, it would be that way." The fact that it requires a particular body and a particular brain in a particular environment is no great hindrance to a general analysis of the origin of *different* qualia.

（GERALD M. EDELMAN, wider than the sky より一部改変）

＜語彙＞

sidestep：回避する、conscious subject：意識を持った主体、fleeting：移ろいゆく（束の間の）、peripheral fringe：抹消的な枝葉・周辺、diffuse reverie：漫然とぼんやりした状態、highly differentiated：高度に分化している、range over：～の範囲に渡る（及ぶ）、a multitude of ：無数の、inner state：内的状態、be dissected into unique isolated parts：独立したパーツに切り離される、focused narrowing of the conscious scene：意識のシーンの焦点を絞ること、vantage point：（有利かどうかという）視点、first-person view：一人称の視点、qualia：クオリア（単数形は quale）、in kind：本質

的な、“What is it like to be a bat?”:『コウモリであるとはどのようなことか』哲学者トマス・ネーゲルの論文。コウモリの神経活動（neural activity）をいくら解明しても、コウモリが感じているクオリアは人間にはわからない、という主張が展開されている。subsidiary issue：副次的な問題、an explosion does not resemble an explosive：爆発（という現象）は爆薬（という物質）とは似ていない、transferable currency：翻訳可能な言語、surmise：推測する、primary consciousness：一次意識、hindrance：障害

＜註＞

同時に実行できる意識的行為がせいぜい２～３ユニットであることをもって、意識の効能の限界であるとする見解は、未来において、意識と（手段的）行為との正しい理解とは言えないだろう。

問 1. 下線部①を和訳しなさい。(80 字程度)

問 2. 下線部②conscious states と③conscious acts とはどのようなことか。それぞれの具体例を本文中から抜き出して日本語で述べなさい。(各 30〜40 字程度)

問 3. 下線部④の内容に沿った具体例を考え、日本語で述べなさい。(70〜100 字程度)

問 4. 下線部⑤に対する筆者の反論を本文の内容に即して日本語で述べなさい。(80〜120 字程度)

問 5. 下線部⑥とはどういうことか、端的に日本語で述べなさい。(40 字程度)

問 6. 多くの哲学者は意識やクオリアについて語るとき形而上学的なアプローチをとる。それに対して筆者は「意識体験」や「クオリア」をどのような方法で解き明かそうと考えているか。本文の内容を踏まえて日本語で述べなさい。　(80〜120 字程度)